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Abstract
Recently, we introduced in [1] a model for product adoption in social
networks with multiple products, where the agents, influenced by their
neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives. We identify and
analyze here four types of paradoxes that can arise in these networks.
To this end, we use social network games that we recently introduced in
[17]. These paradoxes shed light on possible inefficiencies arising when
one modifies the sets of products available to the agents forming a social
network. One of the paradoxes corresponds to the well-known Braess
paradox in congestion games and shows that by adding more choices to a
node, the network may end up in a situation that is worse for everybody.
We exhibit a dual version of this, where removing available choices from
someone can eventually make everybody better off. The other paradoxes
that we identify show that by adding or removing a product from the
choice set of some node may lead to permanent instability. Finally, we
also identify conditions under which some of these paradoxes cannot arise.
1 Introduction
One of the most striking paradoxes in game theory is the Braess paradox. It
states that in some road networks the travel time can actually increase when new
roads are added, e.g., see [16, pages 464-465]. This paradox can be expressed
as a statement about congestion games, in which the players’ objective is to
minimize the travel time from the source to the sink, and the cost (travel time)
depends negatively on the number of users of each road segment. Under this
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model, the Braess paradox states that in some congestion games, an addition of a
new strategy (road segment) can trigger a sequence of changes (an improvement
path) that brings the players from the initial Nash equilibrium to a new one
with worse travel time for each player.
The Braess paradox has received a great deal of attention because of its
counterintuitive character and potential implications. It has been studied in
other contexts too, for example queueing networks, see [5]. A natural ‘dual’
version of this paradox, concerning the removal of road segments, has also been
studied, see [7, 8]. This version states that in some congestion games a removal
of a strategy (road segment) can trigger a sequence of changes (an improvement
path) that brings the players from the initial Nash equilibrium to a new one
with better travel time for each player.
Our main contribution is to demonstrate that paradoxes similar to the Braess
paradox and its dual version exist in a natural class of social network models
concerned with the diffusion of multiple products. These paradoxes provide us
with insights into the possible changes triggered by an addition or removal of
products in the considered social networks. We also establish that apart of the
above two paradoxes two other types of paradoxes exist. In particular, it is pos-
sible that an addition of a new product to (respectively, a removal of a product
from) the choice set of a player results in a permanent instability, in the sense
that the sequence of triggered changes may fail to terminate. Furthermore, we
analyze variants of these paradoxes that are for example obtained by stipulat-
ing that the corresponding ‘new situation’ is inevitable instead of only being
possible.
Social networks have developed over the years into a large interdisciplinary
research area with important links to sociology, economics, epidemiology, com-
puter science, and mathematics. Regarding the diffusion of information over
social networks, a flurry of numerous articles, notably the influential [15], and
books, see [4, 10, 19, 11, 6], helped to delineate better this area. It deals with
such diverse topics as epidemics, spread of certain patterns of social behaviour,
effects of advertising, and emergence of ‘bubbles’ in financial markets. The
model of social networks that we consider here was introduced in [1] and more
fully in [2]. In these networks the agents (players), influenced by their neigh-
bours, can adopt one out of several alternatives. An example of such a network is
a group of people who choose providers of mobile phones by taking into account
the choice of their friends.
To analyze the dynamics of such networks, we introduced in [17], and more
fully in [18], a natural class of social network games. In these strategic games,
the payoff of each player weakly increases when more players choose the same
product (strategy) as him - exactly the opposite of what happens in congestion
games. In the same manner that congestion games allow us to frame the Braess
paradox, the games under consideration here allow us to formalize and analyze
the abovementioned paradoxes in social networks with multiple products.
The general setup in which we study these paradoxes makes it possible to
interpret them as phenomena that can take place in any community the members
of which make choices by taking into account the choices of others. An example
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is a ‘bubble’ in a financial market, where a decision of a trader to switch to some
new financial product triggers a sequence of transactions, as a result of which
all traders involved become worse off.
Further, it was noticed in a number of empirical studies that an abundance
of choices may sometimes lead to wrong decisions. To quote from [9, page 38]:
The freedom-of-choice paradox. The more options one has, the more
possibilities for experiencing conflict arise, and the more difficult
it becomes to compare the options. There is a point where more
options, products, and choices hurt both seller and consumer.
Both phenomena can be naturally explained in our framework.
Apart from exhibiting these paradoxes, it is also natural to try to identify
classes of social networks in which the introduced paradoxes cannot arise. The
last part of our work (Sections 7 and 8) is devoted to such an analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the
background material. In Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6, using the social network games,
we define formally and analyze four types of paradoxes. Then, in Section 7 we
consider the case of networks where the underlying graph has no source nodes
and provide sufficient conditions ensuring that one of the main paradoxes cannot
arise. Subsequently, we utilize this result in Section 8, in which we study the
special case where the underlying graph is a simple cycle. Finally, in Section 9
we discuss future research directions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Strategic games
A strategic game for n > 1 players, written as (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn), consists
of a non-empty set Si of strategies and a payoff function pi : S1 × · · · ×
Sn → R, for each player i.
Fix a strategic game G := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). We denote S1 × · · · × Sn
by S, call each element s ∈ S a joint strategy, denote the ith element of s by
si, and abbreviate the sequence (sj)j 6=i to s−i. Occasionally we write (si, s−i)
instead of s.
We call a strategy si of player i a best response to a joint strategy s−i of his
opponents if ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i). We call a joint strategy s a Nash
equilibrium if each si is a best response to s−i. Further, we call a strategy s′i
of player i a better response given a joint strategy s if pi(s′i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i).
By a profitable deviation we mean a pair (s, s′) of joint strategies such
that s′ = (s′i, s−i) for some s
′
i and pi(s
′) > pi(s). Further, when s′i is a best
response to s−i, we call it a best response deviation. Following [14], an
improvement path (respectively, a best response improvement path) is
a maximal sequence of profitable deviations (respectively, best response devi-
ations). Clearly, if a (best response) improvement path is finite, then its last
element is a Nash equilibrium.
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Given two joint strategies s and s′ we write
• s >w s′ if for all i, pi(s) ≥ pi(s′) and for some i, pi(s) > pi(s′),
• s >s s
′ if for all i, pi(s) > pi(s′).
When s >w s′ (respectively, s >s s′) holds we say that s′ is weakly worse
(respectively, strictly worse) than s.
2.2 Social networks
We are interested in strategic games defined over a specific type of social net-
works recently introduced in [1], which we recall first.
Let V = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents and G = (V,E,w) a weighted
directed graph with wij ∈ [0, 1] being the weight of the edge (i, j). Given a node
i of G, we denote by N(i) the set of nodes from which there is an incoming edge
to i. We call each j ∈ N(i) a neighbour of i in G. We assume that for each
node i such that N(i) 6= ∅,
∑
j∈N(i) wji ≤ 1. An agent i ∈ V is said to be a
source node in G if N(i) = ∅.
By a social network (from now on, just network) we mean a tuple S =
(G,P , P, θ), where
• G is a weighted directed graph,
• P is a finite set of alternatives or products,
• P is a function that assigns to each agent i a non-empty set of products
P (i) from which it can make a choice,
• θ is a threshold function that for each i ∈ V and t ∈ P (i) yields a value
θ(i, t) ∈ (0, 1].
Given such a network S, we denote by source(S) the set of source nodes in
the underlying graph G.
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Figure 1: A social network
Example 1. Figure 1 shows an example of a network. Let the threshold be 0.3
for all nodes. The set of products P is {t1, t2, t3}, the product set of each agent
is marked next to the node denoting it and the weights are labels on the edges.
Each source node is represented by the unique product in its product set. ✷
Given two social networks S and S′ we say that S′ is an expansion of S if
it results from adding a product to the product set of a node in S. We say then
also that S is a contraction of S′.
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2.3 Social network games
Next, we recall the strategic games over the social networks in the above sense
that we introduced in [17]. Fix a network S = (G,P , P, θ). Each agent can
adopt a product from his product set or choose not to adopt any product. We
denote the latter choice by t0.
With each network S we associate a strategic game G(S). The idea is that
the agents simultaneously choose a product or abstain from choosing any. Sub-
sequently, each node assesses his choice by comparing it with the choices made
by his neighbours. Formally, we define the game as follows:
• the players are the agents (i.e., the nodes),
• the set of strategies for player i is Si := P (i) ∪ {t0},
• For i ∈ V , t ∈ P (i) and a joint strategy s, let N ti (s) := {j ∈ N(i) | sj = t},
i.e., N ti (s) is the set of neighbours of i who adopted in s the product t.
The payoff function is defined as follows, where c0 is some given in advance
positive constant:
– for i ∈ source(S),
pi(s) :=
{
0 if si = t0
c0 if si ∈ P (i)
– for i 6∈ source(S),
pi(s) :=


0 if si = t0∑
j∈N t
i
(s)
wji − θ(i, t) if si = t, for some t ∈ P (i)
In the first entry we assume that the payoff function for the source nodes
is constant only for simplicity. The second entry in the payoff definition is
motivated by the following considerations. When agent i is not a source node,
his ‘satisfaction’ from a joint strategy depends positively from the accumulated
weight (read: ‘influence’) of his neighbours who made the same choice as him,
and negatively from his threshold level (read: ‘resistance’) to adopt this product.
The assumption that θ(i, t) > 0 reflects the view that there is always some
resistance to adopt a product. Strategy t0 represents the possibility that an
agent refrains from choosing a product.
Example 2. Consider the network given in Example 1 and the joint strategy
s where each source node chooses the unique product in its product set and
nodes 1, 2 and 3 choose t2, t3 and t2 respectively. The payoffs are then given as
follows:
• for the source nodes, the payoff is the fixed constant c0,
• p1(s) = 0.5− 0.3 = 0.2,
5
• p2(s) = 0.4− 0.3 = 0.1,
• p3(s) = 0.4− 0.3 = 0.1.
Let s′ be the joint strategy in which player 3 chooses t3 and the remaining
players make the same choice as given in s. Then (s, s′) is a profitable deviation
since p3(s′) > p3(s). In what follows, we represent each profitable deviation by
a node and a strategy it switches to, e.g., 3 : t3. Starting at s, the sequence of
profitable deviations 3 : t3, 1 : t0 is an improvement path which results in the
joint strategy in which nodes 1, 2 and 3 choose t0, t3 and t3 respectively and
each source node chooses the unique product in its product set. ✷
By definition, the payoff of each player depends only on the strategies chosen
by his neighbours, so the social network games are related to graphical games
of [12]. However, the underlying dependence structure of a social network game
is a directed graph and the presence of the special strategy t0 available to each
player makes these games more specific. Finally, note that these games satisfy
the join the crowd property that we define as follows:
Each payoff function pi depends only on the strategy chosen by
player i and the set of players who also chose his strategy. Moreover,
the dependence on this set is monotonic.
The last qualification is exactly opposite to the definition of congestion games
with player-specific payoff functions of [13], in which the dependence on the
above set is antimonotonic. That is, when more players choose the strategy of
player i, then his payoff weakly decreases.
3 Vulnerable networks
In what follows we introduce and analyze four types of deficient networks. In
this section we focus on the following notions.
We say that a social network S is ∃w-vulnerable if for some Nash equi-
librium s in G(S), an expansion S′ of S exists such that some improvement
path in G(S′) leads from s to a Nash equilibrium s′ in G(S′) such that s >w s′.
In general we have four notions of vulnerability, that correspond to the com-
binations XY , where X ∈ {∃, ∀} and Y ∈ {w, s}. For example, we say that
S is ∀s-vulnerable if for some Nash equilibrium s in G(S), an expansion S′
of S exists such that each improvement path in G(S′) leads from s to a Nash
equilibrium s′ in G(S) such that s >s s′.
First note that there are some obvious implications between the four notions
of vulnerability and inefficiency that we exhibit in Figure 2.
We show now that these implications are the only ones that hold between
these four notions.
Example 3 (∀w). In Figure 3 we exhibit an example of a ∀w-vulnerable network
that is not ∃s-vulnerable. The product set of each node is marked next to it
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Figure 2: Dependencies between the notions of vulnerability
and the weights are labels on the edges. We assume that each threshold is a
constant θ, where 0 < θ < 0.1. Here and elsewhere the relevant expansion is
depicted by means of a product and the dotted arrow pointing to the relevant
node. In this case product t1 is added to node 4.
The initial Nash equilibrium s is the joint strategy formed by the underlined
products, i.e., (t2, t3, t3, t3, t1, t1). Consider now what happens after product t1
is added to the product set of node 4. Then s ceases to be a Nash equilibrium.
Addition of t1 triggers the unique best response improvement path
4 : t1, 3 : t2, 5 : t2, 6 : t0, 4 : t3, 3 : t3, 5 : t0
resulting in the Nash equilibrium (t2, t3, t3, t3, t0, t0). Note that at each step of
any improvement path starting in s triggered by the addition of product t1 to
node 4 there is a unique node which is not playing its best response. For instance,
in the second step of the above improvement path, node 3 is the unique node
which is not playing its best response. Although node 3 can profitably deviate
to t0 instead of t2, in the next step which is unique, node 3 is forced to play
its best response. Therefore it suffices to consider the outcome of the above
best response improvement path. In the Nash equilibrium (t2, t3, t3, t3, t0, t0)
the payoffs of players 1–4 did not change with respect to the original Nash
equilibrium, while the payoffs of players 5 and 6 decreased.
Finally, notice that a network is not ∃s-vulnerable if the underlying graph
has a source node. ✷
1
0.1
✤
✤✤
✤✤
✤✤
✤✤{t2}
2
0.1
✤
✤✤
✤✤
✤✤
✤✤ {t3}
3
{t2,t3}
0.3
✤
✤✤
✤✤
✤✤
✤✤
0.2
**
4
0.2
jj
{t3}
t1
oo
5
{t1,t2}
0.2
**
6
0.2
jj
{t1}
0.3
OO✤✤✤✤✤✤✤✤✤
Figure 3: An ∀w-vulnerable network
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In this specific example the payoff of the player who triggered the change in
the end did not change. A slightly more complicated example, that we omit,
shows that the initiator’s payoff in the final Nash equilibrium can decrease. Also,
one can construct examples in which the payoffs in the final Nash equilibrium
decrease for an arbitrary large fraction of the players and remain constant for
the other players.
Example 4 (∃s). In Figure 4 we exhibit an example of a ∃s-vulnerable network
that is not ∀w-vulnerable (and hence not ∀s-vulnerable). As before we assume
that each threshold is a constant θ, where 0 < θ < 0.1 and we underline the
strategies that form the initial Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 4: A ∃s-vulnerable network
To see that this network is ∃s-vulnerable it suffices to note that starting
from the Nash equilibrium (t3, t3, t1, t1, t2, t2) of the initial network the addition
of product t2 to node 4 triggers the best response improvement path
4 : t2, 3 : t3, 5 : t3, 6 : t0, 2 : t2, 1 : t0, 4 : t0, 2 : t0, 3 : t0, 5 : t0
that ends in a Nash equilibrium in which each strategy equals t0, and conse-
quently each payoff becomes 0.
To see that this network is not ∀w-vulnerable first note that the addition of
product t2 to node 4 also triggers the improvement path
4 : t2, 2 : t2, 1 : t0, 3 : t0
that ends in a Nash equilibrium in which the payoffs of nodes 2 and 4 increase.
Each of the remaining initial Nash equilibria includes a strategy t0. But
when a joint strategy includes t0, then for no s′ we have s >s s′. This al-
lows us to conclude that the considered network is not ∀s-vulnerable. To show
that the considered network is in fact not ∀w-vulnerable we need to analyze
each of the initial Nash equilibria and consider all profitable additions. We
only consider one representative example. Consider the initial Nash equilibrium
(t0, t0, t1, t1, t2, t2) and the addition of product t1 to node 2. This triggers the
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unique improvement path 2 : t1, 1 : t0 that ends in a Nash equilibrium in which
the payoff of node 2 increased. ✷
If we just wish to construct an improvement path, so not necessarily a best
response improvement path, that yields a strictly worse Nash equilibrium, then
a simpler example can be used. Namely, one can drop in the above network
the nodes 1 and 2 and all the arcs to and from them, and adjust the threshold
function of node 3 so that θ(3, t3) < θ(3, t1). Then
4 : t2, 3 : t3, 5 : t3, 6 : t0, 4 : t0, 3 : t0, 5 : t0
is the desired improvement path.
Example 5 (∃w). Next, we provide an example of a ∃w-vulnerable network
that is neither ∃s-vulnerable nor ∀w-vulnerable. It suffices to add to the network
given in Figure 4 a source node 7 with the product set {t1} and connect it to
node 1 using an arbitrary threshold and weight. In each Nash equilibrium, node
7 chooses t1, so its payoff is the same. Further, the choice of this node has no
influence on the choices of other nodes in the Nash equilibria in the original and
the extended networks. So the conclusion follows from the previous example. ✷
Next, we would like to mention the following intriguing question:
Open problem: Do ∀s-vulnerable networks exist?
The following result shows that if they do, they use at least three products.
Theorem 6. When there are only two products ∀w-vulnerable networks, so a
fortiori ∀s-vulnerable networks, do not exist.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that such a network S exists. So a Nash equi-
librium s in G(S), a node, say 1, and a product, say t1, exists such that for the
network expansion S′ obtained by adding t1 to the product set of node 1 each
improvement path that starts in s ends up in a Nash equilibrium s′ in G(S′)
such that s >w s′.
Given an initial joint strategy we call a maximal sequence of best response
deviations to a strategy t (in an arbitrary order) a t-phase. We now repeatedly
perform, starting at s, the t1-phase followed by the t0-phase. We claim that
this process terminates and hence yields a finite improvement path in G(S′).
First note that if a joint strategy s2 is obtained from s1 by having some
nodes to switch to product t1 and t1 is a best response for a node i to s1−i,
then t1 is also a best response for i to s2−i. Indeed, by the join the crowd
property pi(t1, s2−i) ≥ pi(t1, s
1
−i) and pi(t2, s
1
−i) ≥ pi(t2, s
2
−i), so pi(t1, s
2
−i) ≥
pi(t2, s2−i) since pi(t1, s
1
−i) ≥ pi(t2, s
1
−i). Further, pi(t1, s
1
−i) ≥ pi(t0, s
1
−i), so
also pi(t1, s2−i) ≥ pi(t0, s
2
−i). Consequently after the first t1-phase each node
that has the strategy t1 plays a best response. Call the outcome of the first
t1-phase s′′.
Consider now a node i that deviated in s′′ to t0 by means of a best response.
By the observation just made node i deviated from product t2. So, again by
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the join the crowd property, this deviation does not affect the property that
the nodes that selected t1 in s′′ play a best response. Iterating this reasoning
we conclude that after the first t0-phase each node that has the strategy t1
continues to play a best response.
By the same reasoning subsequent t1 and t0-phases have the same effect on
the set of nodes that have the strategy t1: each of these nodes continues to play
a best response.
Moreover, this set continues to weakly increase. Consequently these repeated
applications of the t1-phase followed by the t0-phase terminate, say in a joint
strategy s′. Suppose now a node i does not play a best response to s′−i. If
s′i = t0, then by the construction t1 is not a best response, so t2 is a best
response.
Suppose the initial strategy of node i was also t0, i.e., si = t0. Since s is
a Nash equilibrium in G(S), we have pi(t2, s−i) ≤ pi(t0, s−i). By the join the
crowd property pi(t2, s′−i) ≤ pi(t2, s−i), so pi(t2, s
′
−i) ≤ pi(t0, s
′
−i), which yields
a contradiction. Hence node i deviated to t0 from some intermediate joint strat-
egy s1 by selecting a best response. So pi(t2, s1−i) ≤ pi(t0, s
1
−i). Moreover, by
the join the crowd property pi(t2, s′−i) ≤ pi(t2, s
1
−i), so pi(t2, s
′
−i) ≤ pi(t0, s
′
−i),
which yields a contradiction, as well.
Further, by the construction s′i 6= t1, so the only alternative is that s
′
i = t2.
But then either t0 or t1 is a best response, which contradicts the construction
of s′. We conclude that s′ is a Nash equilibrium in G(S′).
Next, the payoff of node 1 strictly increased when it switched to t1 and, on
the account of the above arguments, during the remaining steps of the considered
improvement path it either increased or remained the same. We conclude that
the final Nash equilibrium s′ is not weakly worse than the original, which yields
a contradiction.
4 Fragile networks
Related notions to vulnerable networks are the following ones.
We say that a social network S is ∃-fragile if for some Nash equilibrium s
in G(S), an expansion S′ of S exists such that some improvement path in G(S′)
that starts in s is infinite. In turn, we say that a social network S is ∀-fragile
if for some Nash equilibrium s in G(S), an expansion S′ of S exists such that
each improvement path in G(S′) that starts in s is infinite. Finally, we say that
a social network S is fragile if G(S) has a Nash equilibrium, while for some
expansion S′ of S, G(S′) does not.
Obviously each fragile network is ∀-fragile, while each ∀-fragile network is
∃-fragile. We now show that these two implications are proper.
Example 7 (Fragile). Consider the network S given in Figure 5 where the
source nodes are represented by the unique product in their product set. We
assume that each threshold is a constant θ such that θ < w1 < w2.
Consider the joint strategy s, in which the nodes marked by {t1}, {t2} and
{t3} choose the unique product in their product set and nodes 1, 2, and 3 choose
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Figure 5: A fragile network
t1, t1 and t2, respectively. For convenience, we denote s by the choices of nodes
1, 2 and 3, so s = (t1, t1, t2). It is easy to verify that s is a Nash equilibrium in
G(S).
Consider now the expansion S′ of S in which product t2 is added to the
product set of node 1. In G(S′) the joint strategy s ceases to remain a Nash
equilibrium. In fact, no joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium in G(S′). Each
agent residing on the triangle can secure a payoff of at least w1 − θ > 0, so
it suffices to analyze the joint strategies in which t0 is not used. There are
in total eight such joint strategies. Here is their listing, where in each joint
strategy we underline the strategy that is not a best response to the choice of
other players: (t1, t1, t2), (t1, t1, t3), (t1, t3, t2), (t1, t3, t3), (t2, t1, t2), (t2, t1, t3),
(t2, t3, t2), (t2, t3, t3). This shows that the initial network S is fragile. ✷
Example 8 (∀-fragile). Consider the network S given in Figure 6. We assume
{t1}
w1
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
1
w2
  ❇
❇❇
❇❇
❇❇
❇
{t1}
t2
oo
3
w2
==③③③③③③③③{t2,t3}
2
w2
oo❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴❴
{t1,t3}
{t2}
w1
44
w1
''
{t2}
w1
ii {t3}
w1
jj
(t1,t1,t2) +3❴❴❴ ❴❴❴ (t2,t1,t2) +3❴❴❴ ❴❴❴ (t2,t3,t2)

✤✤
✤
✤✤
✤
(t1,t1,t3)
KS✤✤✤
✤✤✤
(t1,t3,t3)ks ❴❴❴❴❴❴ (t2,t3,t3)ks ❴❴❴❴❴❴
(a) (b)
Figure 6: A ∀-fragile network and an infinite improvement path
that each threshold is a constant θ, where θ < w1 < w2. Consider the joint
strategy s, in which the nodes marked by {t1}, {t2} and {t3} choose the unique
product in their product set and nodes 1, 2, and 3 choose t1, t1 and t2, respec-
tively. As in the previous example we denote s by (t1, t1, t2). It is easy to check
that s is a Nash equilibrium in G(S).
Now consider the expansion S′ obtained by adding the product t2 to the
product set of node 1. The joint strategy s ceases to remain a Nash equilibrium
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in G(S′). In fact, Figure 6(b) shows the unique best response improvement path
starting in s which is infinite. For each joint strategy in the figure, we underline
the strategy that is not a best response. As in the case of Example 3 at every
step of every improvement path starting in s, there is a unique node which is
not playing its best response. Therefore it suffices to consider the above best
response improvement path. This shows that S is ∀-fragile.
Also note that the game G(S′) has a Nash equilibrium. The joint strategy in
which the nodes marked {t2} along with node 3 choose the product t0, the node
marked {t3} choose the product t3 and the node marked {t1} along with nodes
1 and 2 choose t1 forms a Nash equilibrium. It follows that S is not fragile. ✷
Example 9 (∃-fragile). Consider the network S given in Figure 7(a). Let the
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Figure 7: A ∃-fragile network and an infinite improvement path
threshold be a constant θ, where θ < w3 < w1 < w2. Assume that each source
node selects its unique product. Identify each joint strategy that extends this
selection with the selection of the strategies by the nodes 1, 2 and 3. The joint
strategy s = (t1, t3, t3) is a Nash equilibrium in G(S).
Now consider the expansion S′ obtained by adding the product t1 to the
product set of node 2 in S. The joint strategy s ceases to remain a Nash
equilibrium in G(S′) since node 2 can profitably deviate to t1. Figure 7(b) shows
an infinite improvement path starting in (t1, t1, t3). Therefore S is ∃-fragile.
However, S is not ∀-fragile. First, one can check that s = (t1, t3, t3) is the
only Nash equilibrium in G(S) for which profitable additions exist. Below we
analyse the two profitable additions.
• Addition of t1 to node 2. The following improvement path
2 : t1, 3 : t2, 1 : t4, 2 : t4, 3 : t4
starting in s terminates in the joint strategy (t4, t4, t4) which is a Nash
equilibrium.
• Addition of t3 to node 1. This triggers a unique one-step improvement
path that terminates in a new Nash equilibrium (t3, t3, t3). ✷
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5 Inefficient networks
The last two types of deficiency are concerned with product removal. These
form the dual versions of the paradoxes we have seen so far. In this section we
study the following notions.
We say that a social network S is ∃w-inefficient if for some Nash equilib-
rium s in G(S), a contraction S′ of S exists such that some improvement path
in G(S′) leads from s to a Nash equilibrium s′ in G(S′) such that s′ >w s. We
note here that if the contraction was created by removing a product from the
product set of node i, we impose that any improvement path in G(S′), given a
starting joint strategy from G(S), begins by having node i making a choice (we
allow any choice from his remaining set of products as an improvement move).
Otherwise the initial payoff of node i in G(S′) is not well-defined.
As in the case of the vulnerability, we have four notions of inefficiency that
correspond to the combinations XY , where X ∈ {∃, ∀} and Y ∈ {w, s}. For
example, we say that S is ∀s-inefficient if for some Nash equilibrium s in
G(S), a contraction S′ of S exists such that each improvement path in G(S′)
leads from s to a Nash equilibrium s′ in G(S′) such that s′ >s s.
We now show that the implications between the various notions shown in
Figure 2 for the case of vulnerable networks are also proper implications for inef-
ficient networks. However, in contrast to the concept of vulnerability, here even
when there are only two choices (|P | = 2), there exist ∀s-inefficient networks.
Example 10 (∀s). We exhibit in Figure 8 an example of a ∀s-inefficient net-
work. The weight of each edge is assumed to be w, and we also have the same
product-independent threshold, θ, for all nodes, with w > θ.
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Figure 8: An example of a ∀s-inefficient network
Consider as the initial Nash equilibrium the joint strategy s = (t2, t2, t1, t1).
It is easy to check that this is a Nash equilibrium, with a payoff equal to w − θ
for all nodes. Suppose now that we remove product t1 from the product set of
node 3. We claim that all improvement paths then lead to the Nash equilibrium
in which all nodes adopt t2.
To see this, we simply analyze all the cases that can arise. Since node 3
moves first in the improvement path, it can select either t0 or t2. If it selects t2,
then it will never change again his decision because it has a positive payoff due
to node 1, and t0 will never become a better choice. Hence it will then be the
turn of node 4 to switch. If it switches to t0, then it will have to change again
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and switch to t2 because of the support for the choice of t2 (from node 1). This
means that eventually all nodes switch to t2.
Suppose now that in the beginning node 3 selected t0. Subsequently, node
4 can also switch to t0. However the main observation here is that t0 is not a
best response for any of these nodes. Both nodes receive a positive payoff for
adopting t2 thanks to a support from node 1. Hence no matter which of them
switches to t0 at the beginning of the improvement path, eventually they will
both switch to t2.
To conclude, all improvement paths result in all nodes adopting t2 and pro-
ducing a payoff of 2w− θ for each node, which is strictly better than the payoff
in s. ✷
Example 11 (∀w). We now exhibit a network which is ∀w-inefficient but not
∃s-inefficient (and hence also not ∀s-inefficient). We proceed as in Example 5
and add to the network given in Figure 8 a source node 5 with the product set
{t1} and connect it to node 1, using the same weight w and threshold θ. By the
same argument as in Example 5 the conclusion follows by virtue of the previous
example. ✷
We also remark that one can construct even simpler networks with three
nodes and two products that exhibit the same behaviour.
Example 12 (∃s). Next, we exhibit a network that is ∃s-inefficient but not
∀w-inefficient. The network is shown in Figure 9. The weight of each edge is
assumed to be w, and we also have a product-independent threshold θ (with
w > θ), that applies to all nodes and products except three cases: θ(1, t3) < θ,
and θ(5, t2) = θ(5, t3) > θ. Note that in the underlying graph, each node has
exactly two incoming edges, one from the set {1, 2} and one from {3, 4, 5}.
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Figure 9: An example of a ∃s-inefficient network
To see first that this is a ∃s-inefficient network, consider the Nash equilibrium
(t2, t2, t1, t1, t1). In this joint strategy each node receives suport from exactly
one out of its two neighbours. If we delete t1 from the choice set of node 3,
then we can see that there is an improvement path that converges to all nodes
adopting t2 (by having first node 3 adopt t2, followed by nodes 4 and 5). Hence
in this new Nash equilibrium every node receives support from all its neighbours
and the payoff of everyone has strictly increased.
To argue now that this is not a ∀w-inefficient network, we need to con-
sider all Nash equilibria and argue about all the possible contractions. One can
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verify that the initial game has four Nash equilibria, namely (t2, t2, t1, t1, t1),
(t2, t2, t2, t2, t2), (t0, t0, t1, t1, t1), and (t0, t3, t3, t3, t3). The idea behind this ex-
ample is that in any contraction, either node 1 or node 2 or node 5 will get
worse off in some improvement path. This will happen either because nodes
1 or 2 will lose support for t2 or because node 5 will end up with product t3,
which is a worse choice for him than t1.
Let us analyze the first Nash equilibrium. Note that if the contraction deletes
t2 from the product set of node 1 or 2, then node 2 will end up being worse off. If
the contraction deletes t1 from node 3, then consider the following improvement
path
3 : t3, 4 : t3, 5 : t3, 1 : t3.
The last profitable deviation in this path is ensured by our assumption that
θ(1, t3) < θ. This implies that node 2 is worse off at the end. Similar improve-
ment paths can be found if the contraction involves nodes 4 or 5.
If we consider the second Nash equilibrium, (t2, t2, t2, t2, t2), it is even easier
to see that any contraction makes at least one node worse off in some improve-
ment path since all nodes apart from node 5 receive the maximum possible
payoff under this joint strategy.
Next, we analyze the third Nash equilibrium, (t0, t0, t1, t1, t1). Here the most
interesting contraction is to remove t1 from node 3 (the same things hold if we
remove it from nodes 4 or 5). In that case, we can have the improvement path
3 : t3, 4 : t3, 5 : t3, 1 : t3
where node 5 becomes worse off since θ(5, t3) > θ. The analysis for the fourth
Nash equilibrium is similar and omitted. ✷
Example 13 (∃w). Finally, we exhibit a ∃w-inefficient network that is neither
∀w-inefficient nor ∃s-inefficient. We proceed as in Example 11 and simply mod-
ify the previous example. We add to the network given in Figure 9 a source node
6 with the product set {t2} and connect it to node 1, using the same weight w
and threshold θ. By the same argument as in Examples 5 and 11 the conclusion
follows by virtue of the previous example.
Actually, the argument that this network is not ∀w-inefficient becomes now
simpler because after the addition of the source node 6 the initial game has only
two Nash equilibria, namely (t2, t2, t1, t1, t1, t2) and (t2, t2, t2, t2, t2, t2). ✷
6 Unsafe networks
Finally, we have three notions that are counterparts of the fragility notions. We
say that a social network S is ∃-unsafe (respectively, ∀-unsafe) if for some
Nash equilibrium s in G(S), a contraction S′ of S exists such that some (re-
spectively, each) improvement path in G(S′) that starts in s is infinite. Further,
a social network S is unsafe if G(S) has a Nash equilibrium, while for some
contraction S′ of S, G(S′) does not.
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Analogously to Section 4 each unsafe network is ∀-unsafe, while each ∀-unsafe
network is ∃-unsafe. We now prove that these two implications are proper.
Example 14 (Unsafe). Let S1 be the modification of the network S given in
Figure 5 where node 1 and the source node marked with {t1} has the product
set {t1, t2}. Consider the joint strategy in which this source node along with
node 1 choose t2, nodes 2 and 3 choose t3 and nodes marked by {t2} and {t3}
choose the unique product in their product set. This is a Nash equilibrium in
S1. Now consider the contraction S2 of S1 in which the product t2 is removed
from the source node with product set {t1, t2}. Then S2 is same as the network
S′ in Example 7. Following the argument in Example 7 we conclude that the
initial network S1 is unsafe. ✷
Example 15 (∀-unsafe). Let S1 be the modification of the network S given in
Figure 6 where node 1 and the source node marked {t1} has the product set
{t1, t2}. Consider the joint strategy in which this source node along with node 1
choose t2, nodes 2, 3 and the node marked {t3} choose t3 and nodes marked by
{t2} choose the unique product in their product set. This is a Nash equilibrium
in S1. Now consider the contraction S2 of S1 in which the product t2 is removed
from the source node with product set {t1, t2}. Then S2 is same as the network
S′ in Example 8. Following the argument in Example 8 we conclude that the
initial network S1 is ∀-unsafe but not unsafe. ✷
Example 16 (∃-unsafe). Let S1 be the modification of the network S given
in Figure 7 where node 2 has the product set {t1, t3, t4} and the source node
marked with {t3} has the product set {t1, t3}. Consider the joint strategy in
which this source node along with node 2 choose t1, nodes 1 and 3 choose t2
and nodes marked by {t1}, {t2} and {t4} choose the unique product in their
product set. This is a Nash equilibrium in S1. Now consider the contraction
S2 of S1 in which the product t1 is removed from the source node with product
set {t1, t3}. Then S2 is same as the network S′ in Example 9. Following the
argument in Example 9 we conclude that the initial network S1 is ∃-unsafe but
not ∀-unsafe. ✷
7 Networks without source nodes
Given the variety of paradoxes exhibited in the above examples it is natural
to investigate the status of selected networks. In this section we focus first on
networks where there are no source nodes. This is a reasonable assumption
in social networks as everybody usually has some friends who influence his
decisions. We first identify a property which ensures the non-existence of ∃w-
vulnerable networks, when the underlying graph has no source nodes.
For a joint strategy s and product t, let At(s) := {i ∈ V | si = t}, and
prod(s) := {si | i ∈ V } \ {t0}. Hence, prod(s) is the set of distinct strategies
that are used in profile s. We let also t denote the joint strategy in which
every player selects t. We say that a profile s is a multiple product profile, if
|prod(s)| > 1.
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Theorem 17. Consider a network S whose underlying graph has no source
nodes. If G(S) does not have a multiple product Nash equilibrium, then S is not
∃w-vulnerable.
To prove this result, we use a specific structural property of Nash equilibria in
networks whose underlying graph has no source nodes. Below, we only consider
subgraphs that are induced and identify each such subgraph with its set of
nodes. Recall that (V ′, E′) is an induced subgraph of (V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V and
E′ = E ∩ (V ′ × V ′). For subgraphs C1 and C2, we denote by C1 ∩ C2 the
intersection of the nodes of the graphs. We say that a (non-empty) strongly
connected subgraph (in short, SCS) C of G is self sustaining for a product t
if for all i ∈ C,
• t ∈ P (i),
•
∑
j∈N(i)∩C
wji ≥ θ(i, t).
Hence, C is a self sustaining SCS for a product t if assigning this product
to every node in C ensures that each node in C gets a non-negative payoff. A
self sustaining SCS C is minimal for product t if no subgraph C′ of C is a self
sustaining SCS for product t. First we prove the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 18. Let S = (G,P , P, θ) be a network whose underlying graph has no
source nodes. If s 6= t0 is a Nash equilibrium in G(S), then for all products t ∈
prod(s), there exists a minimal self sustaining SCS C for t such that C ⊆ At(s).
Proof. Suppose s 6= t0 is a Nash equilibrium. Take any product t 6= t0 and an
agent i such that si = t (by assumption, at least one such t and i exists). Recall
that N ti (s) denotes the set of neighbours of i who adopted in s the product t.
Consider the set of nodes Pred :=
⋃
m∈N Predm, where
• Pred0 := {i},
• Predm+1 := Predm
⋃(⋃
j∈Predm
N tj (s)
)
.
By construction, for all j ∈ Pred we have sj = t and N tj (s)⊆ Pred. Since s
is a Nash equilibrium, also
∑
k∈N t
j
(s)
wkj ≥ θ(j, t) holds.
Consider the partial ordering < between the strongly connected components
of the graph induced by Pred defined by: C < C′ iff j → k for some j ∈ C and
k ∈ C′. Take now some SCS C′ induced by a strongly connected component
that is minimal in the < ordering. Then for all k ∈ C′ we have N tk(s)⊆ C
′
and hence N tk(s)⊆N(k) ∩ C
′. This shows that C′ is self sustaining. It is then
straightforward to construct a minimal self sustaining SCS C for product t which
is a subgraph of C′.
Given a network S and a product t ∈ P , let Ct(S) be the set of all minimal
self sustaining SCSs for product t. Let Xt(S) =
⋂
C∈Ct(S),Ct(S) 6=∅
C and Y (S) =⋂
t∈P,Xt(S) 6=∅
Xt(S).
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Proof of Theorem 17: To prove the theorem, we show in fact the following claim.
Suppose that for the network S = (G,P , P, θ) one of the following conditions
holds:
1. for all t ∈ P , Ct(S) = ∅,
2. Y (S) 6= ∅.
Then, S is not ∃w-vulnerable.
In other words, if the network S does not have any self sustaining SCSs or if
the intersection of the set of all minimal self sustaining SCSs is non-empty then
S is not ∃w-vulnerable. Note that condition 1 implies that t0 is the only Nash
equilibrium in G(S) and condition 2 implies that |prod(s)| = 1 for any Nash
equilibrium s in G(S) that is different from t0.
First suppose that for all t ∈ P , Ct(S) = ∅. By Lemma 18 it follows that t0 is
the only Nash equilibrium in S. Consider any expansion S′ of S. Then no player
has a profitable deviation from t0 in S′. Therefore, S is not ∃w-vulnerable.
Now suppose that Y (S) 6= ∅. In this case, we first claim that every non-
trivial Nash equilibrium s in S has the property that prod(s) ⊆ {t1} for some
t1 ∈ P . Suppose this is not the case then for some two different products t1 and
t2, {t1, t2} ⊆ prod(s). Since s is a Nash equilibrium, by Lemma 18, there exists
a minimal self sustaining SCS C1 ⊆ At1(s) for t1 and a minimal self sustaining
SCS C2 ⊆ At2(s) for t2. By definition, At1(s) ∩ At2(s) = ∅ and therefore,
Ct1(S) ∩ Ct2(S) = ∅. This contradicts the assumption that Y (S) 6= ∅.
Consider a Nash equilibrium s in S and an expansion S′. By the above
claim prod(s) ⊆ {t1} for some t1 ∈ P . In the expansion S′, if the new product
t2 is added to a node i, where si = t1, then there is no profitable deviation
from s and consequently, no improvement path starting at s in G(S′). Thus the
interesting case is when the new product t2 is added to a node i where si = t0.
We have two cases.
• Case 1: t2 6= t1. Since prod(s) ⊆ {t1}, there is no profitable deviation
from s and therefore, no improvement path starting at s in G(S′).
• Case 2: t2 = t1. Consider any improvement path in G(S′) that leads to a
Nash equilibrium s′ in G(S′). Since s is a Nash equilibrium in G(S) the
first profitable deviation in the improvement path is of the form i : t1. In
the improvement path, if a joint strategy s2 is obtained from s1 by having
some nodes switch to product t1 and t1 is a best response for a node j to
s1−j , then t1 is also a best response for j to s
2
−j. Indeed, by the join the
crowd property pj(t1, s2−j) ≥ pj(t1, s
1
−j) ≥ pj(t1, s
1
−j) = 0 = pj(t0, s
2
−j).
So the only deviations in this improvement path are to t1. Consequently
in s′ which is a Nash equilibrium, t1 is the product selected by node i (i.e.,
s′i = t1) and pi(s
′) > pi(s). Therefore, the network is not ∃w-vulnerable.
✷
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8 Simple cycle networks
In this section we focus on networks where the underlying graph is a simple cycle.
To fix the notation suppose that the underlying graph is 1→ 2→ . . .→ n→ 1.
We assume that the counting is done in cyclic order within {1, . . . , n} using the
increment operation i ⊕ 1 and the decrement operation i ⊖ 1. In particular,
n⊕ 1 = 1 and 1⊖ 1 = n. We start with the following corollary to Theorem 17.
We begin with the following observation.
Note 19. Consider a simple cycle network. Then s is a Nash equilibrium of
the game G(S) iff s = t¯ for some t ∈ P ∪ {t0}.
Proof. Consider a network S = (G,P , P, θ), where G is a simple cycle. First
note that t0 is always a Nash equilibrium. Consider now a Nash equilibrium
s 6= t0. Then there exists a product t and a node i such that si = t. Since s is a
Nash equilibrium, we have pi(s) ≥ pi(t0, s−i) = 0, so si⊖1 = t as well (otherwise
the node i would have negative payoff). Iterating this reasoning we conclude
that s = t.
Corollary 20. Simple cycle networks are not ∃w-vulnerable (and a fortiori not
XY -vulnerable, where X ∈ {∃, ∀} and Y ∈ {w, s}).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Note 19 and Theorem 17.
The remaining types of deficiency are easy to determine. For the case of
fragile networks we prove the following result.
Theorem 21. Simple cycle networks are not ∃w-fragile (and a fortiori not
∀w-fragile and not fragile).
Proof. Consider a simple cycle network S = (G,P , P, θ), a Nash equilibrium s
of G(S), and an expansion S′ of S. By Note 19 s = t, where t ∈ P∪{t0}. Hence
s remains a Nash equilibrium of G(S′). Consequently S is not ∃w-fragile.
In the case of inefficient networks we have the following result.
Theorem 22.
(i) There exists a simple cycle network S that is ∃s-inefficient (and a fortiori
∃w-inefficient).
(ii) Simple cycle networks are not ∀w-inefficient (and a fortiori not ∀s-inefficient).
Proof. (i) Consider the network shown in Figure 10. Suppose that θ(i, t1) >
θ(i, t2) for all nodes i = 1, 2, 3 and that s = t1 is a Nash equilibrium. Starting
from s, suppose we remove t1 from the product set of node 1. Then there exists
a finite improvement path where all the nodes end up adopting t2, by simply
having node 1 adopt t2 and then having the remaining nodes follow their best
response. Since θ(i, t1) > θ(i, t2), all nodes are strictly better off in this new
Nash equilibrium, t2.
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Figure 10: An ∃s-inefficient simple cycle network
(ii) Consider a simple cycle network S = (G,P , P, θ), a Nash equilibrium s of
G(S), and a contraction S′ of S. By Note 19 s = t, where t ∈ P ∪ {t0}. If
s = t0, then it is impossible that by deleting any product we could make some
player better off. Suppose s = t1 for some product t1. If we delete t1 from
some product set, say of node 1, then there is always an improvement path that
terminates at the Nash equilibrium t0 (simply start with node 1 adopting t0,
and proceed clockwise. Then gradually every other node will switch to t0 since
they eventually lose support for t1). Hence no node is better off in this new
Nash equilibrium. In conclusion, there can be no Nash equilibrium from which
all improvement paths after the contraction will make the set of nodes weakly
better off.
Finally, we consider the case of unsafe networks.
Theorem 23.
(i) There exists a simple cycle network S that is ∃-unsafe.
(ii) Simple cycle networks are not ∀-unsafe (and a fortiori not unsafe).
Proof. (i) Consider the network shown in Figure 11(a) and assume that t is a
Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 11: A simple cycle network and an infinite improvement path
By removing from the product set of node 3 the product t we get in the
resulting game an infinite improvement path depicted in Figure 11(b). (In each
joint strategy we underline the strategy that is not a best response to the choice
of other players.) So the initial network is ∃-unsafe.
(ii) By Theorem 28 in [18] for every simple cycle network S there exists a finite
improvement path in G(S). This implies both claims.
The above analysis does not carry through to all strongly connected graphs.
Indeed, we showed in particular that simple cycle networks cannot be ∀w-
vulnerable and also not ∀s-inefficient. However, in Example 3 we exhibited a
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network that is ∀w-vulnerable and in Example 10 a network that is ∀s-inefficient.
The underlying graphs of both networks are strongly connected.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we provided a systematic study of paradoxes that can arise in social
networks with multiple products. Such paradoxes allow us to better understand
possible undesirable consequences of modifying the choices that are available to
the agents within a social network. The focus of our work was on identifying
these paradoxes and on determining their relative strength.
To analyze them, we used a natural game-theoretic framework in the form
of social network games recently introduced in [17] and [18]. These games
do not always admit (pure) Nash equilibria, and as a result, more types of
paradoxes can arise (as we exhibited), than in the class of congestion games
with its celebrated Braess paradox. Out of all the notions of paradoxes that
we introduced and studied, one question still remained open: do ∀s-vulnerable
networks exist?
In future work we plan to assess the computational complexity of determin-
ing the presence of these paradoxes and plan to analyze other selected networks.
We also plan to expand our analysis of selected classes of networks, determining
which paradoxes can then be present.
Finally, in our analysis we assumed that the agents can refrain from selecting
a product. Recently we initiated in [3] a study of an alternative version of social
network games, in which each agent has to choose a product. This corresponds
to natural situations, for instance when pupils have to choose a primary school
or when each student has to select a laptop. Such social networks are studied by
modifying our framework so that the strategy t0 is not available. This change
leads to a different analysis and different results.
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